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[Vol. 9: 49 as potentially complementary, Parker ignores some of the differences in their difference, which I will attempt to explicate. For Selznick, commitments to both purpose and integrity are necessary to guide responsiveness. Without the institutionalization of these commitments, instead of "controlled adaptation," "drift or opportunism" result.
3 For Teubner, as for Luhmann, the normative closure of a self-referential autopoietic system weakens its adaptivity to the environment, allowing for responsiveness. 4 To supplement Teubner with Selznick requires responding to the collapse of purpose into normativity and integrity into system closure. It requires re-imagining ideals and noticing connections, illuminating takenfor-granted injustices.
For Teubner, at best, we may come to live in "global villages of social autonomous sectors." 5 The task of law would be shaped by the independence of the nodes of a global "heterarchical, connectionistic, network-type linkage of communications." 6 For Selznick, at best, we satisfy our needs for solidarity in a community. 7 Law serves "the human aspiration to sustain coherence and resist fragmentation." 8 To supplement Selznick with Teubner requires responding to the collapse of global communication into community participation and the choice of organicism over multiplicity. It requires re-imagining ourselves as internationalists and noting the irony of choosing subordination, illuminating the challenges from those outside our community.
In an account of law that is "endogenous," "[e]very practice and every institution is seen as 'in society,' fatefully conditioned by larger contexts of culture and social organization." 9 Teubner and Selznick differ in their account of law's endogeneity. Teubner's weakness is that he takes too little account of law's endogeneity. Selznick evaluation of multiple translations ("hermeneutic differences" 19 ). As Selznick emphasizes, we respond to the "non-rational," which is to be distinguished from the "irrational." 20 For Selznick, understanding experience, not simply choice, is necessary for elaborating purpose.
For Teubner, its normative closure is what gives stability to law. 21 Law has such remarkable stability that although Teubner is sensitive to multiple cultures and discourses, he can still write about a "British legal culture" or a "German legal culture."
22 Law stands apart, even if it is "sandwiched" between the "autonomous logic" of the state and the regulated. 23 Structural coupling presents a problem of coordination ("damage limitation" 24 ). The goal is "the stable persistence of the difference." 25 In their couplings, discourses encounter each other exogenously.
For Selznick, law is generated by institutions, both "legal" and "nonlegal," which are better understood as "governed by multiple rationalities and negotiated authority" and being a "loose coupling and even organized anarchy," than as a "unified system of coordination."
26 This understanding of law as endogenous with that which it seeks to regulate expands law's purposes. For example, economic organizations are not understood as confronting law exogenously and through structural coupling re-inscribing the law in terms of economic efficiency. Rather, law endogenously "permeates the most fundamental morals and meanings of organizational life: Law constructs and legitimates organizational forms, inspires and shapes organizational norms and ideals, and even helps to constitute the identities and capacities of organizational 'actors. '" 27 Dispensing with structural coupling, endogeneity also explains how the economy can reshape legal rationality. Teubner understands "norms of employee protection" as the use of "law as a means of control to constitutionalize the economy."
28 Employee protection disputes, however, also have "infused legal norms with managerial values, such as the importance of smooth relations, the therapeutic underpinnings of most disputes, and the importance of building relationships and preserving community." 29 This describes neither the introduction of a new code nor the collision of discourses and rationalities. Almost unnoticed, legal rationality gives greater prominence to negotiation, mediation and arbitration. Efficiency enters not as an alien, but as a legal value, such as in the right to a speedy trial. 30 Mimetic processes require neither surrender nor conscious adoption.
Seeing agonistic, exogenous battles -the collision of discoursesTeubner may ignore changes that don't appear to threaten normative closure, but which sap integrity. 31 Reflexive law is an account of normativity. But, consider in light of the endogeneity discussed above that "insofar as law is informal, flexible, negotiated and reflexive law, it will tend to cast itself as a constitutive discourse and practice within society rather than in instrumental terms."
32 Normativity, as both legality and rationality, 33 is continually under construction in "interlinked contemporaneous discourses" 34 of both legal actors and those in the regulated field.
Selznick as a complement to Teubner, as Parker recognizes, directs us to keep our attention focused on legal ideals. For Teubner, though, focusing on legal ideals means focusing on normativity, and this may be shaped to permit or perpetuate injustice. Selznick's understanding of the complexity of experience means that evaluations and deliberations are but a part of 27 Edelman & Suchman, supra note 16, at 493. Edelman and Suchman contrast the endogenous and autopoietic approaches in id. at 502 n.21. 28 Teubner, Juridification, supra note 2, at 11-12. 29 our experiments in elaborating purpose. Selznick's understanding of the mutually constitutive nature of law and organizations means that integrity is always at risk and attention must be paid to "the fate of ideals in the course of social practice." 35 The endogeneity of law and society not only supplements any account of structural coupling, but even questions it.
Selznick provides an account of "the integration of law and society." springs from . . . local or particularistic . . . institutions." 46 To protect values, "government must be seen as derivative and instrumental -as the agent of community, not its creator." 47 Consequently, in the name of value legal pluralism asks how groups, institutions and governments should interact.
Teubner has already criticized Selznick for not responding to "the crises of rationality, legitimacy, and motivation." 48 A more focused critique might be to draw on Teubner's role as an international lawyer and ask more about the standpoint that Selznick has adopted. The Moral Commonwealth, like Selznick's other writings, is particularly American, not only in focusing on U.S. law, but in ignoring the possibility of an internationalist perspective. 49 Once government is derivative of community, why don't communities have claims on other nations' governments? What legal orders emerge or should emerge from transnational (or diasporic) communities? An endogenous perspective on global phenomena, Teubner might point put, readily supports imperialist projects. Selznick might be asked to detail how impositions of law do not become the responsive solutions to conflicts of laws? As conflicting values emerge from different communities, what are legal practitioners to do? 50 Teubner also can criticize Selznick based on the facts of social exogeneity. Selznick compares social systems with ecosystems and sees their analysis as based on similar principles. 51 The bounded nature of the system and its interdependence allows for "agreement on foundational ideas." 52 As problems and interactions are global, Selznick's method derives warranted solutions
